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Causation in Tort Law: A Reconsideration
Keith N. Hylton

Forthcoming in Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts (Jennifer Arlen, ed., Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2013)

Abstract: Causation is a source of confusion in tort theory, as well as a flash point between
consequentialist and deontological legal theorists. Consequentialists argue that causation is
generally determined by the policy grounds for negligence, not by a technical analysis of the
facts. Conversely, deontologists reject the view that policy motives determine causation findings.
Causation has also generated different approaches within the consequentialist school. In this
chapter I try to bring some order to the arguments on causation by isolating key elements of the
cases and introducing a “causation tree” that highlights the role of information. A better model
of causation may help to resolve the arguments between different schools of tort theory, and to
reconcile conflicting models within the consequentialist school.



William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University, and Professor of Law, Boston University
School of Law. For helpful comments I thank Jennifer Arlen. John Goldberg, Henry Smith, and the students in
their private law workshop also provided helpful comments, especially Anneil Kollavi. I thank Nina Prevot and
Matt Saldana for research assistance.

INTRODUCTION
Causation is a source of confusion in tort theory, as well as a flash point for the debate
between consequentialist and deontological legal theorists. 1 Consequentialists argue that
causation is generally determined by the policy grounds for negligence, not by a technical
analysis of the facts.2 Conversely, deontologists reject the view that policy motives determine
causation findings.3
Causation has also generated different approaches within the consequentialist school.
Some take an essentially forward-looking approach to formalizing causation analysis, finding
causation analysis to be subsumed within the Hand Formula. 4 Another approach within the
consequentialist school closely examines the incentive effects of causation in the presence of an
uncertain application of the negligence test. 5 This approach makes use of the fact that the
causation test is applied retrospectively, but it makes no attempt to reconcile itself with the
forward-looking approach.
In this chapter I will try to bring some order to the arguments on causation. 6 My
perspective is consequentialist, but the arguments here have implications for the deontological
theorists as well. In particular, by isolating the key elements of the causation cases, and
introducing a “causation tree” to aid analysis, I hope to identify important missing pieces in the
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Wright (1985a, 1985b). For a critique of the deontological approach, see Kelman (1987).
Calabresi (1975), Malone (1956).
3
Calabresi (1975), Malone (1956).
4
Calabresi (1975), Landes and Posner (1983), Shavell (1980). The Hand Formula, articulated by Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), holds that an actor is negligent if he fails to
take care when the burden of care (B) is less than the product of the probability of loss (P) and the severity of the
loss (L) – i.e., B < PL.
5
Grady (1983), Kahan (1989), Marks (1994).
6
This chapter is a companion piece to Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin (2013), which sets out a new model of
causation analysis. This chapter discusses the literature on causation and identifies gaps in the analysis, laying the
groundwork for the Hylton and Lin paper.
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existing literature on causation. A better model of causation may help to resolve the arguments
between different schools of tort theory, and to reconcile conflicting models within the
consequentialist school.
This chapter is organized as follows. Part 2 discusses canonical causation cases, and
identifies different notions of causation observed in the case law. Part 3 reviews the economic
literature on causation. Part 4 presents a framework for causation analysis developed in Hylton &
Lin (2013) that incorporates and extends preexisting economic approaches. Part 5 uses the
framework of Part 4 to examine informational constraints binding on courts in causation cases.
Part 6 concludes.

CLASSIFICATION OF CAUSATION CASES
Causation is a basic requirement of tort liability. Whether the victim has been injured by
intentional or negligent conduct, the injurer will not be held liable unless a court finds that the
injury, for which the victim sues, was caused by the injurer’s conduct. In negligence lawsuits,
causation is one of the basic elements that the plaintiff must demonstrate in order to prevail.
Negligence consists of four components: duty, breach, causation, and damages. Although duty is
typically not a difficult matter in most cases, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to
establish each of these components in a negligence lawsuit. This means that if the facts are too
uncertain for a court to be able to say, at the end of a trial, that it is more likely than not that the
defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury, the plaintiff’s negligence lawsuit will fail.
The causation cases in tort law raise two distinct issues, factual and proximate causation,
with factual causation usually associated with but-for causation and proximate causation usually
associated with foreseeability. To be specific, factual causation, in a negligence lawsuit, is
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determined by asking whether the injury would have happened even if the defendant had taken
care.7 Proximate causation is determined by asking whether the plaintiff’s injury was foreseeable
given the defendant’s negligence.
It follows from these definitions that it is possible for the factual causation test to be
satisfied without the proximate causation test being satisfied. For example, a negligent traffic
maneuver by the defendant might delay the plaintiff, causing the plaintiff to arrive at a spot
where lightning strikes. In this case, there is causation in the but-for sense––that is, the plaintiff’s
injury would not have happened if the defendant had not caused the plaintiff to be delayed––but
not in the proximate or foreseeable sense. Proximate causation means there is a “probabilistic
linkage” between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury, in that knowledge of the
defendant’s negligence would lead one to predict the plaintiff’s injury.
This suggests that the cases can be sorted into a matrix:

Proximate Causation
But-For
Causation
No But-For
Causation

A cases

No Proximate
Causation
B cases

C cases

D cases

Start with the A cases, the first cell in the upper-left corner. In most cases that appear in
court, there will be both factual (but-for) and proximate causation. For example, suppose the
defendant’s truck swerves in front of the plaintiff’s car, causing the plaintiff to veer to the side of
the road, as in Marshall v. Nugent.8 Another oncoming driver sees the truck at the last minute,
swerves to avoid hitting it, and runs directly into the plaintiff’s car. The defendant truck driver’s
negligence is not only a but-for cause of the plaintiff’s injury but also probabilistically linked to
7
8

See generally Prosser (1971), 236–90.
222 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1955).
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the injury. If the defendant truck driver had not turned in front of the plaintiff, the plaintiff would
not have had to swerve to the side of the road, and the accident would not have occurred.
Moreover, it is probable that a negligent move by a truck driver that forces one car to move to
the side of the road, causing the truck to block the road, could lead to another accident.
Now consider B cases, the category in which but-for causation is present but there is no
proximate causation. This time, the truck swerves in front of the plaintiff’s car, causing the
plaintiff to swerve to the side of the road. The plaintiff is delayed in his travel as a result of the
confusion. When the plaintiff reaches an intersection three blocks from the incident, a bolt of
lightning hits him. Now there is clearly but-for causation in the sense that the plaintiff would not
have been hit with lightning if he had not been delayed. But there is no probabilistic linkage;
there is no reason to predict a lightning strike following the defendant’s negligence.
For the remaining cells in the table, it will help to distinguish two senses of proximate
causation. One is general proximate causation, which occurs when a failure to take care leads
generally to a foreseeable set of incidents. For example, speeding can be a type of negligence,
depending on the setting that leads generally to traffic accidents. Failure to equip a boat with
lifebuoys can be a type of negligence that leads generally to drowning incidents. The other type
of probabilistic causation is specific proximate causation, which is based on the set of facts in a
particular case. Although speeding may lead generally to a greater risk of accidents, the
particular type of speeding in a particular case may have no probabilistic connection at all to the
accident that occurs.
Consider the D cases, the bottom-right cell. Suppose the defendant builds a fence
surrounding cricket grounds that is unreasonably low, as alleged in Stone v. Bolton.9 That is a

9

[1950] 1 K.B. 201.

4

type of negligence that leads generally to injuries caused by cricket balls being hit over the fence.
But suppose the ball in a particular instance is hit so high over the fence that it would have easily
cleared a fence set at the reasonable height. Although there would be general proximate
causation in this scenario, there would be no specific proximate causation. If a ball were hit over
the fence so high that it would have cleared a fence at the reasonable height, the but-for test is
not satisfied because the accident would have happened anyway; there would be no specific
proximate causation, although there would be general proximate causation.
Consider another hypothetical related to the category of “no but-for causation and no
proximate causation” (D cases). Suppose the defendant swerves his truck in front of the plaintiff,
causing him to veer to the side, which delays his trip. The plaintiff, recognizing that he may be
delayed, speeds up to a point where he is no longer late. At that point, he is struck by lightning.
The defendant’s negligence is not a but-for cause of the injury; the accident would have
happened even if the defendant had not been negligent. Neither is it probabilistically linked in
the general sense; a negligent move that delays the victim does not lead generally to lightning
strikes. Lastly, the defendant’s negligence is not probabilistically linked in the specific sense; the
particular negligence described does not enhance the probability of the plaintiff being the victim
of a lightning strike.
Another case in the bottom-right cell is Perkins v. Tex. & New Orleans Ry. Co.10 The
defendant railroad’s negligence consisted of driving 15 miles an hour above the speed limit.
However, the facts established that even if the train had been operated at the speed limit, the
plaintiff would not have had time to evade the train. In this case, there is no but-for causation; the
accident would have happened even if the train had been operated at the speed limit. There is

10

147 So. 2d 646 (La. 1962).
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proximate causation in the general sense (speeding tends to lead to accidents) but not in the
specific sense (this particular case of speeding, i.e., the excess over the speed limit, did not affect
the probability of the accident).
The C cases category, the bottom-left cell, is designed to capture cases in which there is
no but-for causation, but there is proximate causation. It appears at first glance to be difficult to
find examples in which there is no but-for causation but there is specific proximate causation. In
many settings in which the accident would have happened even if the defendant had not been
negligent, it will also appear that the defendant’s negligence did not increase the probability of
the accident in the particular case. However, some examples of specific proximate causation
coupled with the absence of but-for causation can be found in cases involving uncertainty over
factual causation. Suppose, for example, a doctor performs surgery on a patient. The patient
would die, in the absence of negligence, with a probability of 30 percent, and negligence
increases the probability of death to 40 percent. One could argue that the doctor’s negligence is
not a but-for cause of the patient’s death, since the death very likely would have occurred (in
three out four instances of death coupled with negligence) even if the doctor had not been
negligent. The type of negligence under consideration satisfies the general proximate causation
requirement, and arguably satisfies the specific proximate causation requirement since the
negligence significantly increases the likelihood of death.
In this chapter I will focus on factual causation. However, the arguments I will develop
below can be applied easily to proximate causation analysis.11

CAUSATION ANALYSES: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

11

See Hylton & Lin (2013).
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The consequentialist literature in this area consists of two major strands. The first I will
label the Shavell-Landes-Posner strand.12 The second I will label the Grady-Kahan-Marks
strand.13
The Shavell-Landes-Posner strand suggests that causation analysis has little to offer that
is independent of the Hand Formula analysis of negligence. The argument concludes that in
almost any case in which a court would hold that the defendant is not negligent based on factual
causation, the Hand Formula analysis reveals that the defendant is not negligent.
Using the distinction I introduced above between general probabilistic linkage and
specific probabilistic linkage, there are cases in which the defendant may appear to be negligent
based on a general analysis, but when one examines the case in terms of the specific probabilistic
linkage, it appears that the defendant was not negligent. Consider, for example, Perkins: the train
was operated at a rate in excess of the speed limit, but the plaintiff would not have had time to
evade the train even if it had been operated at the speed limit. In terms of general probabilistic
linkage, operating a train above the speed limit is conduct that increases the likelihood of an
accident. However, in terms of the specific linkage, the excessive speed had no effect on the
likelihood of the particular accident that happened.
The Shavell-Landes-Posner argument reduces to the following: in cases where there is
general proximate causation but not specific proximate causation, the correct conclusion is that
the defendant is not negligent. The additional precaution required to avoid a negligence finding
would not affect the probability of an accident under the actual conditions––i.e., additional care
would have been unproductive. Given this, there is no economic case for requiring additional
care.
12
13

See Landes & Posner (1983), and Shavell (1980).
See Grady (1983), Kahan (1989), and Marks (1994).
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The Grady-Kahan-Marks argument focuses on the incentives affected by the factual
causation test in tort law. According to Grady-Kahan-Marks, the causation test removes a
discontinuity in the relationship between the level of care and liability, and consequently nudges
incentives for care closer to optimality in settings where there is uncertainty surrounding the
application of the negligence test.
The Grady-Kahan-Marks argument, first developed by Mark Grady, is best explained by
the cricket fence hypothetical explored by Marcel Kahan. In the cricket hypothetical, the ball
sails over the fence at a height that would have still led to the same accident (an injury from
being hit by a cricket ball) even if the fence had been set at the reasonable height. Since the
accident would have happened even if the fence had been set at the reasonable height, the factual
causation test of tort law would not be satisfied by the plaintiff’s claim.
The Grady-Kahan-Marks analysis shows how the factual causation test affects incentives
for care, in comparison to a negligence test that does not take factual causation into account. For
example, suppose factual causation is not taken into account. Let the reasonable fence height be
ten feet, and consider the cricket ground owner’s liability when the fence is at ten feet. In this
case the cricket ground owner would not be held liable, because the fence is at the reasonable
height.
Now suppose the owner lowers the fence by one inch to nine feet 11 inches, now one
inch below the reasonable level. If factual causation is not taken into account, the owner
becomes liable for all cricket balls that fly over the fence, irrespective of the height at which the
ball clears. If factual causation is taken into account, the owner becomes liable only for cricket
balls that pass between ten feet and nine feet 11 inches. So, when the factual causation test is
taken into account, the owner’s liability increases continuously from zero as he lowers the fence
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from the ten-foot level. When the factual causation test is not taken into account, the owner’s
liability jumps discontinuously as soon as he lowers the fence from the ten-foot level.
As this analysis suggests, the factual causation test can impact incentives for care, if there
is uncertainty surrounding the application of the negligence test. In particular, suppose the court
makes mistakes in assessing negligence, and the mistakes are more likely as one gets closer to
the reasonable fence height. Realizing this, an owner would consider the likelihood of liability if
his fence were mistakenly found to be above or below the reasonable height. The factual
causation test has a powerful effect in this scenario. Suppose the court does not take factual
causation into account. If the owner’s fence is mistakenly found to be slightly above the
reasonable height, the owner’s liability is zero. If his fence is erroneously found to be slightly
below the reasonable height, his liability jumps substantially. If, in contrast, the court does take
the factual causation test into account, then a finding that the owner’s fence is slightly below the
reasonable height leads to a very small increase in liability above the zero level.
Given the asymmetric effect of judicial errors in assessing liability, the potential
defendant will err on the side of excessive precaution in a regime in which courts do not take
factual causation into account in assessing negligence. In contrast, the tendency to over-comply
with the negligence standard will not be observed in a regime in which the factual causation test
is applied.
The Grady-Kahan-Marks analysis, as emphasized in Grady’s original presentation,
suggests a positive theory of the causation doctrine. The causation test appears at first glance to
serve no obvious function other than to permit some defendants to escape liability, and some
courts have suggested that they would refuse to apply it.14 But the Grady analysis shows that the

14

See, e.g., Stone v. Bolton, infra, fn 9.
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causation test plays a role in regulating precaution in the presence of a negligence test that may
be applied with error by courts. The factual causation test leads potential defendants to choose
care levels that are closer to the reasonable care level than would be observed in the absence of
the factual causation test.
It would appear to follow from Grady’s theory that in settings where the cost of overcompliance with the negligence standard is small, or substantially less than the cost of any undercompliance that might result under the factual causation test, courts should not be concerned
with rigorously applying the factual causation test. On the other hand, where the cost of overcompliance is large relative to the cost of under-compliance, Grady’s theory suggests that courts
would be more likely to apply the factual causation test.
For example, suppose the victim is accidentally pushed from a ten-story building and
plummets toward the ground. As the victim is falling, the injurer negligently fires his rifle and
kills the victim before he hits the ground. On factual causation grounds it would appear that the
injurer should not be held liable for the victim’s death; he would have been killed by the impact
with the ground even if the injurer had not negligently shot him. But courts have been reluctant
to apply the but-for test to cases of this sort, probably because the social cost of undercompliance is greater than the social cost of over-compliance.
Instead of the but-for test in cases of concurrent negligence, courts have applied the
substantial factor test originating in Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry.
Co.15 and in Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co.16 In both cases two negligently created fires
join and destroy property. The courts abandoned the but-for test and replaced it with a substantial
factor test for causation in these cases. Application of the but-for test would result in neither
15
16

179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920).
211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927).
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tortfeasor being held liable, which would dilute incentives for care in the concurrent caretaking
scenario.17 The under-compliance cost resulting from application of the factual causation test to
these cases would be much greater than the possible over-compliance cost resulting from
refusing to apply the factual causation test.
Stephen Marks introduces an important difference in the Grady-Kahan analysis. Marks
finds that, even under the assumptions of Grady and Kahan, the factual causation test still leads
to excessive care when there is uncertainty regarding the application of the negligence test. The
reason for this is that the Grady and Kahan analysis is built around an example whose
fundamental structure is consistent with the cricket fence hypothetical. In that hypothetical, the
probability of an injury is zero when the injurer takes care (i.e., keeps the fence at the reasonable
height) and the ball is hit at a level that is below the fence height. To generalize, when the
contingency that makes care effective occurs, the probability of an injury is zero in the GradyKahan-Marks analysis. But this is not generally true. In many cases, the probability of an injury
will still be positive when the injurer takes care and when the contingency that makes care
effective occurs.
Consider, for example, Perkins. The injurer would take care in that case by reducing the
speed of the train to the level required by law. The intervention that makes care effective would
consist of the victim being able quickly to get off the train tracks. But even if this were so in
Perkins, a train moving at the speed limit still imposes some risk of harm. One cannot conclude
that the probability of an injury is zero simply because a train, or a car, is moving at the legal
speed limit. The residual risk when potential injurers take care remains positive and significant in
this scenario.

17

Landes and Posner (1983, 125).
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Because the residual risk remains positive even when people take care in the Perkins
scenario, there remains a discontinuous jump in liability under the negligence test. The
negligence test does not subtract off from the damage award an estimate of the damages that
would result even if the injurer took care, and because of this, there is an unavoidable
discontinuity in incentives created by the test.
In spite of this unavoidable discontinuity, the Grady-Kahan-Marks point largely remains.
The discontinuity is less severe––or the size of the jump lessens as a result of the causation test.
Because of this, the causation test reduces the tendency toward socially excessive precaution
when there is uncertainty surrounding the application of the negligence test. Moreover, in the
special case represented by the cricket hypothetical, the causation test removes the discontinuity
entirely.

ASSESSING ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CAUSATION AND INCENTIVES
Given the contrast between the Shavell-Landes-Posner and the Grady-Kahan-Marks
analyses of factual causation, the obvious question is which theory provides the best or most
useful analysis of the causation problem in tort law. The two theories ought to be reconciled. One
holds that causation is largely a distraction, once one has taken a careful approach to the
negligence assessment according to the Hand Formula. The other holds that causation doctrine
plays an important role in understanding incentives created by negligence law. Obviously, the
two propositions are not mutually exclusive; but the question remains whether the two theories
can be reconciled.
Under the framework adopted in the previous section, the causation cases can be
described according to three general features: whether there is causation in the but-for sense,
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whether there is a general probabilistic linkage (general proximate cause) between the
defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury, and whether there is a specific probabilistic
linkage (specific proximate cause) between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury.
In the class of causation problems analyzed by Grady and Kahan, there is no causation in the butfor sense, and no specific probabilistic linkage, but there is a general probabilistic linkage. The
general probabilistic linkage exists in the cricket ball case because a fence set below the
reasonable level is likely to be associated with injuries caused by balls flying over the fence.
There is no specific probabilistic linkage because the ball flies at such a height that the injury
would have happened even if the owner of the grounds had set the fence at the reasonable height.
And, for the same reason, there is no but-for causation in the cricket case.
The cricket hypothetical is a special case of a more general class of causation problems.
In general, causation is an issue even in cases in which all three causation features are operative:
the but-for test could be satisfied, there could be a general probabilistic linkage, and there could
be a specific probabilistic linkage. The cricket hypothetical arises as a special case where the
specific probabilistic linkage shrinks to zero.
Consider an example that illustrates the more general factual causation problem, N.Y.
Cent. R.R. v. Grimstad.18 In Grimstad, the defendant was sued for negligence for failing to equip
a barge with lifebuoys, after the plaintiff’s decedent, a barge captain, fell into the water and
drowned. The plaintiff lost on factual causation grounds. The court noted that even if the boat
had been equipped with lifebuoys, there was no guarantee that anyone would have been able to
grab the lifebuoy, throw it sufficiently close to the captain to be useful, and for the captain to
grab it securely, all in time to prevent the drowning. Grimstad is a case in which it is unclear a

18

264 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1920).
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priori whether the but-for causation test is satisfied, or whether there is a specific probabilistic
linkage between the defendant’s negligence and the victim’s loss.
The factual structure of Grimstad can be set out as a causation tree, as shown in Figure
4.1.19 The “care” path represents the scenario in which the defendant has equipped the boat with
lifebuoys; the “no care” path assumes the defendant has failed to equip the boat with lifebuoys.
In Grimstad, equipping the boat with lifebuoys was not enough by itself to reduce the probability
of a drowning. The effect of equipping the boat depended on the likelihood of successful
intervention––in fact, on a chain of successful interventions.
In Grimstad, and cases with similar fact structures, the probabilities associated with each
branch on the causation tree are as shown in Figure 1. If the defendant does not take care (by
failing to equip the barge with lifebuoys), then the probability of a drowning is r. If the defendant
takes care under the legal standard (equips the barge with lifebuoys), then the probability of a
drowning depends on the probability of an intervention (s); for example, whether the victim can
swim to the lifebuoy. If an intervention occurs, then the conditional probability of injury
(drowning) given the intervention is w, where w < r. If an intervention does not occur, the
conditional probability of injury given the absence of intervention is simply the same probability
of injury if there had been a breach (r). The probability of an injury given that the defendant
takes care is therefore sw + (1–s)r.

19

The model presented informally in this part is based on Hylton & Lin (2013).
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Figure 1: Causation Event Diagram
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A general probabilistic linkage would be observed if the average probability of injury
given precaution is significantly less than the probability of injury given no precaution. General
probabilistic linkage between the defendant’s failure to take care and the plaintiff’s injury is
assumed to exist in this case, because a failure to take care increases the probability that the
plaintiff will be injured from sw + (1–s)r to r (where sw + (1–s)r < r by assumption).
In order to capture within this model the difference between general and specific
probabilistic linkages, I will assume that there is a range of possible intervention probabilities in
different settings. When an accident occurs, it is accompanied by a specific realization drawn
from the range of possible intervention probabilities. To simplify, assume there are two possible
levels for the intervention probability: so and s1, with corresponding probabilities po and p1. In
other words, there are two settings in which intervention may occur, and those settings appear
with frequencies po and p1. If intervention setting po is realized, then the probability of an
intervention occurring in that setting is so. Under this assumption, the general expected
intervention probability is E(s) = poso + p1s1, and the expected probability of injury given that the
defendant takes care is

15

E ( s ) w  (1  E ( s )) r .
Suppose the amount of the loss (the damages claim) if the victim drowns is represented
by D. If the defendant fails to take care, the expected loss is rD. If the defendant takes care, then
for any given realization si of the intervention probability, the expected loss is equal to (siw + (1–
si)r)D. If the burden of complying with the negligence standard (equipping with lifebuoys) is B,
then the defendant would be negligent, given a realization si of the intervention probability, if he
failed to equip the boat when
B < (r – (siw + (1– si)r)D .
The left-hand side of this inequality is the burden of precaution and the right hand side is
the incremental loss avoided by precaution. As the probability of intervention gets smaller, the
less likely it is that the incremental loss avoided is greater than the burden of precaution; hence
the less likely it is that the defendant is negligent. If the likelihood of intervention is zero, for
example, the defendant clearly would not be negligent in failing to equip the boat with lifebuoys.
As long as the probability of intervention is positive, the incremental loss avoided by precaution
(right-hand side of the inequality) will be positive; but there is no guarantee that it will be greater
than the burden of precaution.
The factual causation problem in cases like Grimstad requires the court to determine, in
light of the facts, whether the probability of intervention is so small that the incremental loss
avoided by precaution is equally small, or obviously less than the burden of precaution. The
finding is interesting largely because it seems to contradict an assessment based only on the
general probabilistic linkage. In the specific case, the incremental loss avoided may be found to
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be less than the burden of precaution, while on a general assessment the incremental loss avoided
might be greater than the burden of precaution.
The structure of the general causation scenario exemplified by Grimstad can therefore be
described as follows:
B > (r – (sow + (1–so)r)D
B < [r – ( E ( s ) w  (1  E ( s ))r ) ]D

where so is the case-specific intervention probability.
In order to clarify this description of structure, consider the following numerical example.
Suppose there are two probabilities of intervention: so = ¼ and s1 = ¾. The low-intervention
probability corresponds to the instances in which the captain of the barge is alone, or on the
barge with only his wife. The high-intervention probability corresponds to instances in which the
captain is on the barge with other experienced sailors. The likelihood of a successful intervention
is low when the captain is alone, and high when the captain is surrounded by other sailors.
Associated with these intervention scenarios are frequencies. The frequency with which the lowintervention probability scenario occurs is po = ¼ and the frequency with which the highintervention probability scenario occurs is p1 = ¾.
One important feature of this structural description is that the frequencies with which the
high-intervention and low-intervention probability scenarios occurs may be known by the
captain and the barge owner, but may be unavailable to a court. The court may be unable,
therefore, to determine whether additional safety precautions will have a substantial effect on the
likelihood of injury on an ex ante basis.
Given the assumptions of this numerical example, the expected probability of injury
given that the defendant (barge owner) takes care (installs lifebuoys) is equal to (¼)(¼) + (¾)(¾)
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= 5/8. Assume the cost of taking care is $40 and that the injury is $160. Assume, in addition,
that w = ¼ and r = ¾. Comparing the burden of taking care to the ex ante benefit (in terms of
losses avoided):
 3  5   1   3   3   
$40               $160
 4  8   4   8   4   

which is equivalent to $40 < $50. Thus, taking care (installing lifebuoys) is socially desirable on
an ex ante basis. Suppose, however, that the accident occurs in a low-intervention probability
state––for example, when the captain is alone on the barge, or there with only his wife. The court
observes the facts of the case and that the intervention probability is only ¼ in the case that
comes before it. When the court analyzes the defendant’s negligence, it compares the burden of
taking care to its estimate of losses avoided, given the observed intervention probability. The
court’s estimate of losses avoided is:
 3  1   1   3   3   
             $160 = $20
 4  4   4   4   4   

and since this is less than the cost of taking care, $40, the court concludes that the defendant
could not be negligent.
The causation problem analyzed by Grady and Kahan can be treated as a special case
within this framework. Consider the cricket hypothetical. The height at which the ball sails over
the fence determines the realized (specific) intervention probability. If the ball flies over the
“reasonable height” for the fence, then the fact that the fence was at the reasonable height would
have no effect on the probability of an injury. Thus, if ten feet is the reasonable height, the event
“ball flies over fence at height greater than ten feet” implies that the intervention probability is
equal to zero. The precaution of having a fence at the reasonable height reduces the probability
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of an injury only in the intervening event of a ball flying at a height no greater than ten feet. Put
another way, there is no specific probability linkage given the event that the ball flies at a height
greater than ten feet. The general probability linkage is established by the fact that at the
reasonable fence height (ten feet) any additional increase in height would require a burden that is
greater than the incremental losses avoided, based on expectations.
In this framework, the Shavell-Landes-Posner model of causation and the Grady-KahanMarks analysis are easily reconciled in terms of the levels of ex ante and ex post information on
intervention probabilities. In the Grady-Kahan-Marks analysis, there is a reasonable fence height,
based on averages or statistical expectations. If the defendant fails to meet the reasonable height,
he is negligent, based on an ex ante assessment. However, if the ball flies over the fence at a
height that exceeds the reasonable fence height, the court will excuse the defendant on causation
grounds (after observing the realized probability of intervention). In the Shavell-Landes-Posner
analysis, there is a reasonable fence height, again based on an ex ante assessment of averages. If
the defendant fails to meet the reasonable fence height, he is still not negligent if the ball flies
over the fence at a height that is greater than the reasonable fence height. The explanation is that
the reasonable precaution, if taken, would not have altered the likelihood of the accident. These
are two different ways of describing the same phenomenon. Courts typically adopt the first
description, but the second is equivalent in its implications.

EX ANTE VERSUS EX POST APPROACH
So far I have described causation analysis as requiring a differentiation between a general
probabilistic linkage and a specific probabilistic linkage. This approach is consistent with the
cases, but it is still inadequate to capture all that is going on in the causation cases.

19

The important feature that is missing in the preceding discussion is a consideration of the
information available to the parties in the ex ante (before the accident) and ex post (after the
accident) time periods. General probabilistic linkage refers to the ex ante period in which care
must be taken before the specific probability of intervention has been revealed. Specific
probabilistic linkage refers to the ex post period after the specific probability of intervention has
been revealed.
For example, return to Grimstad. In the ex ante period, the barge owner (or some agent of
his) has to decide whether to install lifebuoys. He must make the decision without knowing the
specific probability of intervention that will be realized. Hence, the barge owner must choose a
level of care knowing only the distribution of the future intervention probability. Social welfare
would be optimized if he took care (installed lifebuoys) whenever doing so reduces the sum of
accident and accident avoidance costs ex ante.20
What does it mean for the barge owner to know the distribution of the intervention
probability? It means that the barge owner has sufficient information to make a reasonably
accurate guess about the likelihood of a successful rescue (successful intervention) in the
accident setting. That is a function of the amount of time the barge workers (sailors) will be
around others who can carry out a rescue competently. If the barge captain is unlikely ever to be
on the barge alone without competent support, the barge owner would predict that the
distribution of the intervention probability is skewed toward one. On the other hand, if the
captain is likely to spend a lot of time on the barge alone, or with only his wife (as was the case
in Grimstad when the accident occurred), then the intervention probability distribution will be
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In more technical terms, when inequality (2) holds.
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skewed toward zero. If these scenarios happen with roughly equal frequency, then the
intervention probability may have a uniform or symmetric distribution.
The court is unlikely to be in a position to make this assessment. Specifically, the court is
unlikely, even after all of the evidence is presented at trial, to know the ex ante distribution of the
intervention likelihood. To have such information would require the court to replicate the
experience-based knowledge of the barge owner.

Since knowing the distribution of the

intervention probability is essential to estimate the expected losses to be avoided by taking care,
and the court does not know the distribution, the court would be unable to determine negligence
in an accurate manner.21
The problem of information in this setting is a common one in negligence law. The
knowledge of the court consists of that possessed by the judge and the jury. The judge and jury
observe sufficient evidence to make an ex post assessment of negligence. But the information
required to make an ex ante assessment of negligence is often privately held by one or more of
the parties in litigation, and incapable of being verified by the court. In some cases, specifically
those in which courts are at a substantial informational advantage relative to the defendant, a
custom defense could provide an optimal standard for determining negligence, since custom
would presumably reflect the information possessed by the actors within the industry.
As an illustration, return to Grimstad. The court is unlikely to have enough information to
determine whether failing to install lifebuoys is negligent, because in order to do so in an
economically accurate way, the court would need information on the distribution of the
probability of a successful intervention (i.e., a rescue performed by throwing a lifebuoy
accurately and in time), which is a function of the frequency with which the barge captain is
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surrounded by experienced sailors. One possible solution to this problem is for the court to
require the parties to generate information on the distribution of the intervention probability. But
this may not be sufficient to put the court in the same position as industry actors. The
information generated in court would be presented by partisans, and the court therefore would
have to discount presentations from each side of the dispute.
In the absence of full information on the ex ante optimal standard of care, the court can
assess negligence using a backward-looking or ex post approach. The ex post method requires
the court to use information revealed by the accident to estimate the actual probability of
intervention ex post, and to determine negligence on the basis of that information. This is
equivalent to an ex post negligence evaluation using the specific intervention probability
revealed in the accident event,22 and it is what the court did in Grimstad. The court noted that the
potential rescuer was the barge captain’s wife, and that there was no evidence to suggest that she
would have known where to find the lifebuoys and been able to throw one with sufficient speed
and accuracy to prevent the captain from drowning. Given the information revealed by the
accident, the court determined that causation was purely speculative, and that there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding of negligence.
The ex post approach to negligence probably captures the reasoning of courts in the vast
majority of causation cases. This is obviously so in cases such as Grimstad, but it appears to be
true also of the more technical but-for causation cases such as the cricket fence hypothetical
discussed earlier. In these cases, the court determines negligence by examining what happened in
the accident. Ex post, it knows the actual probability of intervention. If it finds that the revealed
probability of intervention is too low to support a finding of negligence on the basis of an ex post
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assessment, it is likely to conclude that the evidence of causation, or of negligence, is purely
speculative. If it finds that the probability of intervention as revealed is close to zero, it can
conclude in the same manner. The but-for causation test, which involves determining whether
the revealed probability of intervention is close to zero, is essentially subsumed in the ex post
negligence assessment. The but-for causation test is a sufficient condition for finding an absence
of negligence.
The general acceptance of the substantial factor test is, most likely, a reflection of the
tendency of courts to adopt an ex post evaluation of negligence in settings where the ex ante
determination of negligence is either administratively burdensome or has been precluded by the
existence of a statute that settles the negligence determination. The substantial factor test requires
the court to determine whether the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in bringing
about the plaintiff’s injury.23 The test invites courts to apply an ex post assessment of negligence
rather than search for a reliably correct answer to the but-for causation question. The substantial
factor analysis is far more consistent with the court’s analysis in Grimstad than is the but-for test.
I have not argued that it is never possible for a court to accurately apply the but-for
causation analysis. For a court to do so, it would first have to have an accurate assessment of
negligence on an ex ante basis; after obtaining this assessment it would then apply the but-for
test. In a simple case, such as the cricket fence hypothetical, it may be possible for a court to
have sufficient information to determine the reasonable fence height ex ante. At the ex post
stage, it might be relatively easy for a court to determine whether the cricket ball flew over the
fence at such a height that it would have easily cleared a fence of reasonable height. But it should
be clear that this example represents a special case that will not be replicated in structure in much
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of the case law. The uncertainties surrounding the evaluations of ex ante negligence and ex post
causation are often too great for such an ideal application of formal standards and tests.
Indeed, even in the cricket fence hypothetical it is likely that in most such scenarios it
would be difficult to determine whether the cricket ball flew over the fence at a height that would
have easily cleared a fence set at the reasonable height. To make such a determination, one
would have to accurately determine the trajectory, or the entire arc, of the cricket ball, and
compare the trajectory with the (invisible) line at which the ball would pass over (or run into) the
reasonable height fence. In scenarios where the ball is popped straight up and lands on the other
side of the fence, the determination could be made roughly without difficulty. But outside this
case, most ball-over-fence cases will involve uncertainty over the trajectory question.
Given the informational bind in which courts are often likely to find themselves, they are
left with three options: (1) applying an ex post negligence standard, (2) applying a strict liability
rule, or (3) trying to determine the ex ante negligence standard based on incomplete information.
The law on strict liability sets out a clear policy basis for its application, first set out
generally in Rylands v. Fletcher.24 Many of the uncertain factual causation cases cannot meet the
requirements for strict liability described in Rylands. The option of applying a strict liability rule
is effectively foreclosed in many cases by the doctrinal constraints of Rylands.
The third option, determining the ex ante negligence standard, is difficult, subject to
gaming by litigants on whom the court relies for information, and discouraged by evidence
norms. The realized intervention probability is objectively verifiable and therefore acceptable
evidence. The average intervention probability required to construct an ex ante negligence
standard is not objectively verifiable, and would require estimation and conjecture.
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The causation cases are generally consistent with the ex post negligence standard as a
method of conducting causation analysis. First, it is obvious that negligence is being determined
by an ex post analysis. In every case that comes before a court, the accident has happened
already, so the court is determining negligence using information on the revealed probability of
an intervention. Second, the courts are unlikely in many cases to have enough information to
make a reasonably accurate estimate of the losses to be avoided by taking care––an estimate that
would require knowledge of the distribution of the probability of intervention. Given these two
generally observed features of litigation, viewing causation analysis as subsumed within an ex
post assessment of negligence seems entirely appropriate.
The cases are also consistent with the ex post negligence approach. Grimstad is an
obvious example. The court made no attempt to determine negligence on an ex ante basis. The
evidence in Grimstad did not point clearly to an answer on the causation issue. The court could
not say with certainty that a successful rescue would not have occurred under the facts of the
case if the defendant had equipped the boat with lifebuoys. All the court could say was that the
evidence did not suggest that a successful rescue was likely to occur if the boat had been
properly equipped, and that negligence, in the specific event, was a matter of speculation. This is
in essence an ex post negligence evaluation.
There are other cases in the same mold. In Rouleau v. Blotner,25 the plaintiff sued the
defendant for negligence in failing to signal with his car blinker before turning his truck across
oncoming traffic. However, the evidence indicated that the plaintiff’s driver was looking at the
stretch of road immediately before his car at the time when he should have been looking for a
turn signal, which is why the plaintiff’s driver did not see the truck until it was too late. In
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Rouleau, just as in Grimstad, the evidence was not clear enough to say with certainty that the
accident would have happened even if the plaintiff had taken care. However, the evidence did
not suggest the opposite, either: that the accident would not have occurred if the defendant had
switched his turn signal on. It was a matter of speculation whether the accident would or would
not have happened.
Some cases speak in relatively clear terms about causation even though the evidence is
not so clear. In City of Piqua v. Morris,26 the court concluded confidently that the plaintiff’s loss
(due to a flood) would have occurred even if the defendant had taken the requested precautions
(clearing debris from wickets to allow water to pass). But a close read of the case reveals that the
evidence was ambiguous. The court concluded that it would not have mattered if the defendant
(City of Piqua) had taken precautions because the flood was so large that the wickets could not
have carried away the water even if they had been cleared of debris, and consequently the
plaintiff’s property loss was almost entirely attributable to the unusual rainfall that occurred. The
facts support the conclusion that the evidence on causation was ambiguous at best.
There are some cases that are distinguishable from the ex post negligence approach
because the facts indicate with near certainty that the accident would have happened even if the
requested precaution had been taken. Many of them involve accidents on roads, or on railroad
tracks. If a car is being driven at a speed of 60 miles per hour, and a non-negligent rate is 55
miles per hour, it is easy for a court to calculate the additional time that an actor would have to
avoid a collision if his speed had been shifted down to 55. If the additional time is trivial––such
as one second––then a court is in a good position to assert that the accident would have happened
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anyway. Of course, even here the court is making a statement about the quality of the evidence,
not a statement about certainty.
Given that courts are applying an ex post assessment of negligence in many if not all of
the causation cases, the next question is why courts apply such an assessment instead of
attempting to get enough information to conduct an ex ante Hand Formula analysis. I have
already referred to two possible explanations: the prohibitive cost of acquiring the information
necessary to conduct an ex ante assessment and the constraints placed on courts by evidence
norms. Two other possible reasons are the existence of statutory standards of care and the
behavioral tendencies of decision-makers under uncertainty.
The existence of a statutory standard of care that is breached forces the court to
distinguish negligence from causation, and the court is more or less compelled to find negligence
for the breach. However, the court examines causation separately. As a result, many of the cases
involving statutory breaches involve findings of negligence coupled with findings of no
causation. The separate causation test plays an important role in allowing the court to apply an ex
post negligence test after concluding that the statutory breach answers the ex ante negligence
question.
The remaining possible explanation for why courts apply the ex post negligence test is
behavioral. 27 Social scientists have identified a behavioral pattern favoring wagers that have
estimable probabilities to those that do not––that is, an aversion to ambiguity. The same bias
may be present in courts. The ex post assessment of negligence involves working with
probability estimates that are observable or calculable based on information in a particular case.
The ex ante assessment of negligence means trying to discover information on probability
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distributions that may not be completely available to courts. The behavioral preferences revealed
by ambiguity aversion may be at work within the minds of judges; they prefer to conduct an
assessment of negligence working with information at hand rather than working with
probabilities that are unknown. This is simply reflecting an aversion to assessing negligence in a
setting of “unknown unknowns.”
All of this is not to say that courts never estimate optimal care standards from an ex ante
perspective. As a procedural matter, all negligence and causation determinations are made ex
post and use information revealed by the accident. Where the accident technology is so simple
that courts can easily estimate the optimal care standard from an ex ante perspective, courts
would presumably recognize the superiority of doing so.

CONCLUSION
There is much more to be said about causation analysis than I have ventured here.
Philosophically-oriented writers have devoted a great deal of attention to the logical bases for
attributions of causation.28 I have not discussed these questions in this chapter. However, my
arguments have implications for the corrective justice torts theorists. To the extent informational
constraints bind the courts, the decisions on causation may simply reflect the best that courts can
do under the constraints. They do not necessarily reflect an inclination to avoid policy-based
assessments of negligence, even if that were possible. With limited information, and compelled
by circumstances to conduct an ex post evaluation of negligence, courts have adopted the
language of causation analysis as a substitute to a policy-grounded analysis of negligence. A
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court that issues of finding of “no causation”, is saying in effect that it does not have enough
information to support a finding of negligence.
Instead of focusing on the arguments between consequentialist and deontological schools
of tort theory, I have focused on modeling the basic structure of causation disputes. The literature
on the incentive effects of the causation test has been based on models that are incomplete as
descriptions of the causation problem in tort cases. The corrective justice theorists have not
modeled the causation problem, but their discussions have assumed that information constraints
do not bind courts. I have only outlined here a more comprehensive framework for analyzing
causation based on differentiating ex ante and ex post analyses of negligence.
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